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Small Business Uniqueness and 
the Theory of Financial Management
James S. Ang
Small businesses do not share the same financial management problems with 
large businesses. This paper shows that the source of the differences could be 
traced to several characteristics unique to small businesses. This uniqueness in 
turn creates a whole new set of financial management issues. The major 
implication is that, yes, there are new and interesting topics in small business 
financial management research.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is fair to say that the theory of modern corporate finance is not developed 
with small businesses in mind. For instance, the stylized theoretical firm is 
assumed to have access to external capital market for debt and equity. The 
shareholders have limited liabilities and own diversified portfolios. A most 
relevant question to practitioners and researchers interested in the 
application of finance to small businesses is: Will the extant theory of 
corporate finance sdll be applicable? And if not, in what way would the 
theory for small business financial management differ?
A reasonable starting point to develop the new paradigm for small 
business financial management is to identify features of small businesses that 
are not considered in the modelling of the large firm paradigm because they 
are deemed unimportant or unnecessarily complicated. These unique 
characteristics of small businesses could generate a different set of financial 
problems, or cause small businesses to look at the same set of financial prob­
lems in a different manner. As a consequence, different financial decisions, 
types of financial arrangements, institutions, and practices may evolve.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a list of unique 
characteristics of small businesses that are relevant to financial management; 
Section III presents new interpretations of major financial management 
issues, such as agency and information, that incorporate these features; 
implications for small business financial management theory are discussed 
in section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
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II. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FIRMS
In spite of official classifications, e.g., businesses with less than 500 
employees, there is probably no consensus definition of a small business. 
As a matter of fact, the term could be a misnomer since relatively large firms 
listed in the lower quintile or quartile of the COMPUSTAT and CRSP data 
tapes are often arbitrarily classified as ‘small firms’ for convenience in 
empirical studies. These are not really small firms and are not of theoretical 
interest in this paper. For the sake of being able to present a more interesting 
analysis and to stimulate discussions, a business is classified as small if it 
possesses most of the following characteristics:
(a) No publicly traded securities. The business has neither debt nor 
stock traded in organized exchanges. This feature makes a small 
business unique in several ways; it does not have a ready market 
valuation for its shares, it has low information reporting 
requirements, and most importantly, it has fewer sources of 
financing. Access to public issue markets is relatively expensive 
for some, and impossible for the very small.
(b) Owners have undiversified personal portfolios. Investment in the 
business often constitutes a major portion of the owner’s personal 
wealth. A few owners may achieve some personal diversification 
via life insurance policies, bank accounts, small stock portfolios, 
and self employment pension accounts. Nevertheless, the assets of 
a small business are on the whole more product, customer or 
geography specific than a large business. A large holding in a risky 
business also translates to a riskier personal portfolio for the 
owners.
(c) Limited liability is absent or ineffective. The limited liability 
provision is not available in the proprietorship and the partnership 
organizational forms. For small businesses organized as a 
corporation, it is often ineffective to protect the owners against 
personal losses from business failure since they are required by the 
lenders to provide a personal guarantee or put up noncorporate 
personal assets as collateral for loans.
(d) First generation owners are entrepeneural and prone to risk taking. 
Through the process of self-selection, those that are willing to take 
risks [7], to manage their own company and put in long hours, 
and to push through their ideas for new products, start new
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businesses. These first generation owners prefer a potential high 
return, and are wilhng to tolerate the corresponding higher risks. 
This attitude, which is quite different from that of the managers 
of large firms, could affect the small businesses’ choice of financial 
strategies, with regard to riskiness and time horizon.
(e) The management team is not complete. The management of small 
businesses lacks depth and versatility. The management team of 
a small business suffers from several related shortcomings.
1. It may depend on a single or a few key individuals to provide 
the technical talent, leadership, or customer contact.
2. It may not have a contingent plan for succession to ensure 
continuity.
3. It may lack a full complement of managerial talents with 
knowledge and skills in finance, marketing, production and 
international business.
4. It may not be able to adjust to changes in the external 
environments, or to a different stage of development as the 
firm matures.
It is this lack of depth and scope of management that accounts 
for one of the major differences between a small business and a 
large but privately held firm.
(f) Experiences high cost of market and institutional imperfections. 
Due to imperfections, the small scale and limited managerial 
resources, the cost of doing business is higher for small businesses. 
Small businesses are likely to pay proportionally more in 
bankruptcy/failure costs [1], cost of compliance with regulations, 
transaction costs of financing, negotiation costs, and litigation 
costs.
(g) Relationships with stockholders are less formal. The relationships 
between small business owners and outside stockholders are more 
implicit and less contractual. Owners/managers personally deal 
with their stockholders and thus, depending on the frequency of 
past and potential future transactions, personal reputation could 
be of value. Information collected on small businesses is often 
fragmented and private. As a result, learning and previous track 
records could be important as well. However, cost of monitoring 
and bonding[4] could be relatively high.
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(h) It has high degree of flexibility in designing compensation 
schemes. A single proprietor could integrate income from the 
business and other sources into an aggregate function that 
maximizes long term personal consumption. Compensation and 
consumption could be postponed in the formative years of a small 
business by entrepreneurs who take a long term view. Owners in 
a partnership and subchapter S corporation could integrate 
personal incomes to minimize personal taxes. They would be 
indifferent between compensation or profit distributed from the 
firm.
Most small businesses, from mom and pop stores to a new 
high tech firm, are expected to possess most of these features. These 
characteristics lend themselves to identify the different types of 
financial problems by the small businesses which are discussed 
next.
III. FINANCE ISSUES: THE SMALL BUSINESS VERSION
This section reexamines some fundamental financial issues with the small 
businesses in mind. It shows that small businesses have financial 
management issues that are quite different from those of the larger businesses. 
Thus, new and different solutions would also be required.
Agency Problems
The incorporation of the unique characteristics of small businesses 
expands the topic of agency in several ways. First, allowing alternative 
organizational forms such as proprietorship and partnership introduces 
several new classes of agency problems. Although the combination owner/ 
manager in a proprietorship resolves the manager vs. owner agency problem, 
the agency problem between the owner/managers and other stakeholders 
could actually be more serious. The absence of publicly traded shares, the 
risk taking tendency of entrepreneurs, the lack of management depth, the 
problem of succession, and the limited personal wealth of owners could 
imply a shortened expected duration for the firm and thus a shortened 
transaction horizon with the stakeholders as well, which in turn creates 
opportunities for agency problems. Examples include owners as fly by night 
operators, and lenders, unions, and suppliers exercising monopoly power 
over the small businesses.
The combination of partnership where there could be several partners 
actively involved in the business, and unlimited liabilities for the partners
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could be a fatal combination in many circumstances. Each partner would 
be personally liable for every partner’s actions. A good portion of the partners’ 
resources could conceivably be expended on cross monitoring. Lack of ready 
market valuation also creates a serious exit problem for the partners. 
Anticipating departures, partners, maximizing their own utilities, may 
employ strategic decisions that may not be in the best interests of the firm. 
Even in the corporate firm, ineffective limited liability, lack of market 
valuation and high monitoring costs creates agency problems for small 
businesses. In a subchapter S corporation, for instance, since minority shares 
have to pay tax on current profit even if payout is zero, agency costs due 
to undistributed dividends could be quite real.
Second, solutions to agency problems, such as bonding and monitoring, 
are relatively more expensive to the small businesses, thus, raising the cost 
of transactions between the small businesses with their creditors, shareholders 
and other stockholders. Third, small businesses and their stakeholders would 
find new or different ways to solve the agency problems. For instance, small 
businesses would attempt to establish a good reputation with outside 
stcikeholders by limiting their transaction to fewer stakeholders, this would 
increase the frequency of transactions with each stakeholder as well as 
voluntarily bond the firm from seeking out alternative opportunities. The 
outside stakeholders, such as suppliers and bankers, who must deal with 
many small businesses have the incentive to demonstrate good faith and build 
reputations too. To increase the value of the relationships and reduce agency 
costs, outside stakeholders may even encourage intergenerational transfer of 
reputation in a small business.
Information
Outside stakeholders of small businesses face several information 
problems. The first is the familiar asymmetric information problem where 
the insiders are expected to be more informal about the prospects of the firm. 
This problem is more serious in small businesses than in Izirge businesses 
because of
(1) the relatively high fixed cost of gathering information for a small 
transaction,
(2) the smaller number of repeated transactions,
(3) the smaller incentives for a third party, such as outside analysts and 
rating agencies, to collect information for sale since the market of 
this type of information is also smaller, and
(4) the small businesses may have greater difficulties in making their 
claims or signals credible. One reason is that they have fewer
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instruments to signal and the other is their lack of significant
bonding or ex-post settling up costs that could be offered.
The second information problem concerns the quality of data generated 
by the small businesses for review by the stakeholders. Small businesses may 
not have the managerial talent and staff to come up with data useful to the 
stockholders. Since they do not have publicly traded securities, they are not 
under legal or institutional constraints to produce verifiable information. 
Finally, there is a problem with differences in expectations. Owners/ 
entrepreneurs are expected to be more optimistic about the firm’s prospect 
than outside stakeholders. The outside stakeholders are also expected to 
discount the more optimistic projections. However, the owners are aware 
of such discounting, and the outside stockholders are also aware that the 
owners are already expecting a downward revision. The process, therefore, 
becomes a gaming situation where accurate information could only be 
unraveled under certain circumstances where conjectures and countercon­
jectures could be properly modelled and accounted for.
Failure Costs
Several unique features of small businesses affect failure costs. The 
probability of failure could increase with the risk taking entrepenuer, 
incomplete management team, limited alternative sources of financing, lack 
of alternative measures of value due to the absence of traded securities, agency 
conflicts and succession problems. The costs of failure are also higher as the 
small businesses face higher costs of market imperfections and frictions such 
as higher proportional legal, accounting, trustee and auctioning fees. On 
the other hand, lack of effective limited liability could cause a transfer of 
failure costs at the firm level to the personal level of the owners. Owners 
who are averse to the stigma of business and personal bankruptcies as well 
as the loss of personal reputation for future business ventures, would have 
the incentive to take actions to reduce the probability of failure by deferring 
compensation, or contributing their own capital to relieve cash flow 
shortage. The lenders have a similar incentive to reduce failure costs. They 
may demand more frequent reporting and access to private information so 
that early warning for potential failure could be identified, and lower cost 
alternatives could be worked out. Thus, the issue of failure for small 
businesses is more complex. Owners integrate the consequence of failure at 
both the firm and the personal levels. The effect on banlauptcy probability 
could depend on the owner’s willingness to risk personal failure as well as 
the generosity of the personal bankruptcy law with regard to the amount 
of assets the bankrupt is allowed to keep.
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Taxes
There are several differences in the taxation of small businesses vis-a- 
vis large businesses. First, the progressiveness of corporate and personal 
taxation at certain low income levels is relevant to small businesses and not 
to large businesses. Gains in tax planning near the jump in marginal tax 
rates could be worthwhile. Second, owners would integrate business and 
personal incomes to compute the marginal tax rates on business investment 
and financial decisions. Third, estate tax considerations and the lack of 
market valuation could affect the type of financial decisions made. For 
example, there are alternative means of transferring an estate to heirs that 
may affect the firm’s capital structure, ownership composition, and asset mix. 
A case in point are the tax breaks on estate tax if the transfer is to establish 
an ESOP [6].
Transaction Costs
The price of high transaction costs to small businesses is to preclude 
them from certain financial choices or services. The high fixed costs of 
preparing a public issuance of securities, the high costs of compliance to 
government regulations, the costs of securing the service of top notch 
investment bankers or financial consultants, or even the costs of investigation 
to be incurred by potential stockholders could all shut the firm out of some 
financial and product markets, as well as types of investors.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL DECISIONS
The challenges to finance researchers interested in small business finance 
are to identify problems that make small firms unique, formulate testable 
hypotheses, collect new sets of small firms specific data, and verify the 
hypotheses empirically. Eventually, this process will produce an inventory 
of new knowledge about small business financial management. This section 
makes some educated conjectures concerning possible differences in the 
financial management decisions made by small businesses in comparison 
to the more familiar large firms. Small businesses are too heterogeneous to 
be lumped into a single category, they differ in terms of history or track 
record, availability of growth opportunities, organizational forms, etc. Thus, 
whenever possible, specific predictions or conjectures concerning a particular 
type of small businesses are in the discussion.
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Capital Budgeting
An important research question here is whether small businesses would 
make the correct investment decision. Specifically, in the absence of market 
valuation, would small businesses accept all positive NPV projects only, or 
would they overinvest by accepting too many negative NPV projects, or 
underinvest by rejecting too many positive NPV projects. The answer 
depends on several factors: (1) whether small businesses could obtain capital 
at the same costs as the large firms, otherwise, underinvestment could occur,
(2) whether small businesses are capable of performing the optimizing 
calculations as the large firms; if not, both under or over investment could 
be observed, (3) whether the unique characteristics of small businesses induce 
a built-in bias to the estimation of cash flows? Optimistic estimates by the 
entrepreneurs, for instance, may result in overinvestment. Another source of 
potential upward bias could arise from the small businesses’ lack of a 
complete management team. There could be a gap between what a small 
firm could achieve for a project if it had the marketing and distribution 
channels, production technology, etc. (the normal or large firm NPV), and 
what it could reasonably achieve (the realizable or small firm NPV). 
Decisions made by the small firm on the basis of the former measure would 
overestimate the project’s benefit and result in overinvestment.
A serious information problem would arise in a capital budgeting 
situation when an asymmetric information problem is confounded by 
heterogeneous expectations. An assumption implicit in a signaling 
equilibrium is that the firm as the signaler knows the true value of the new 
project without bias such as rational expectations. When this assumption 
is violated, there are more optimistic owners/entrepreneiurs as well as more 
informed owners. Both types are equally willing to pay the cost of signaling 
such as, quit existing job, take a pay cut, dip into own savings or pension, 
mortgage residence, etc. Lenders who are aware of such behavior would make 
less funds available. Many projects would not be funded, including some 
good projects, while some inferior projects may be financed since the lenders 
do not have the perfect ability to discriminate between the two types. Thus 
both over and underinvestments could be observed among small businesses.
There are other instances where small businesses would underinvest. 
Succession problem, potential cash drains due to estate taxes, or the possibility 
of exit by some partners could lead to a reluctance to invest and bypass good 
projects. Also, projects with multiple future options are worth less to small 
businesses if they do not have the resources to fund or implement the future 
options if exercised. One solution is a merger of the small firm and a large 
firm with a ‘deep pocket’, more managerial talents, or organizational 
resources, thus providing a rationale for acquiring small firms.
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Finally, when compared to large firms, some small firms may 
underinvest due to a shortage of internally generated funds under a pecking 
order regime. Other small firms may also overinvest in very risky projects 
when the amount of personal wealth under unlimited liability is small. In 
contrast, large firms with a portfolio of a large number of assets would 
hesitate to invest in the same risky project since, instead of exercising its 
limited liability option, the rest of the firm may have to subsidize the short 
fall of the risky project. Thus limited liability, if it is effective, is more 
valuable for small firms than for large firms. The lenders, being aware of 
this difference, would rationally charge the large firm a lower cost of 
borrowed funds for a smaller likelihood of exercising the limited liability 
provisions (a put option). The small firm, facing a higher cost of capital, 
would end up not investing in some risky projects.
In sum, over and under investment could occur in small businesses. 
Overinvestment may occur in projects in which small businesses hold 
optimistic expectations, or underestimate their ability to execute a project 
with high degree of complexity, in which large amount of managerial and 
organizational resources are required. They may also accept very risky project 
when personal wealth and liability is limited. On the other hand, succession 
and exit problems, underestimating the value of projects with multiple future 
options, and lack of internally generated funds under a pecking order regime 
could result in underinvestment by the small business.
Capital Structure
The capital structure issue for the small firms differs from their large 
firms’ counterpart in several ways. First, small businesses rely on different 
sources of funds. For a new business, the primary sources are: owner’s own 
savings and personal borrowings, friends and relatives, local banks, and 
small business related sources (venture capital companies, SBIC, Minority 
SBIC, SBA, etc.). In addition, there are also implicit equity contributions 
in the form of reduced or below market pay and overtime. The exact cost 
of funds from these sources is not well understood and is left as an empirical 
undertaking. However, there seems to be a pecking order for these funds as 
well. Second, the value of limited liability is reduced. One way the providers 
of funds to the small businesses could minimize agency costs from the owners 
is to make potential gains to opportunistic owners less attractive by 
increasing their potential loss. As a solution, the limited liability provision 
at both the firm and personal level is weakened. Banks would often require 
personal assets, guarantees, and insurance policies as collateral. Even friends 
and relatives, who may provide the financing based not exclusively on 
financial considerations, would expect payback beyond the declaration of
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firm or personal bankruptcy via the court system. Making the hmited liability 
provision less valuable may be a major reason to explain v^hy some small 
businesses could obtain financing from these sources or any financing at all.
Third, the role of strategic bargaining and gaming between owners and 
their sources of financing assumes even greater importance in small 
businesses. Lacking access to public security markets, the owners of small 
businesses deal with their lenders in two-party transactions, which involve 
negotiations and renegotiations. Here, the strength of each party’s 
bargaining position is important. The lenders are often in a stronger 
bargaining position. They are refrained from fully exploiting it because of 
the desire to maintain a long term relationship and the possibility of 
competition from other lenders. It is nevertheless an empirical question 
whether the term of the loan reflects the relative strength of the bargaining 
positions. The small businesses, although in an inferior bargaining position 
due to limited access to funds, may learn to behave strategically, such as when 
to renegotiate and what information to reveal. In the extreme, when the 
probability of negotiation to fail is high, the firm may also need to 
accumulate slacks, and contacts with alternative sources of funds for strategic 
reasons.
Fourth, since for many forms of small business organizations, such as 
proprietorship, partnership, and subchapter S corporation, taxes are 
integrated at the personal level. A weakened limited liability would also make 
bankruptcy costs at least partially chargeable to the personal level as well. 
Consequently, optimal capital structure will in most part be determined at 
the personal level. Furthermore, because the relevant firm level tax rate is 
the owner’s personal tax rates, it is not likely to be higher than the personal 
tax rates of their wealthier friends and relatives with excess funds, or the 
corporate tax rate of the banks. The grossed up portion of interest rate at 
equilibrium would exceed the owner’s personal tax shield from borrowing. 
Thus, we have a potential puzzling result: There seem to be no tax incentives 
for owners of small businesses to use debt. In the case of a small corporation 
with sufficient profit to pay the higher corporate tax rate for large firms, 
some owners may designate some equity investment as debt (most likely 
subordinated) to realize an immediate tax advantage vis-a-vis dividends, and 
an offset to tax on personal interests received. Fifth, small businesses may 
use debt for various purposes not related to the capital structure decision. 
For instance, they may borrow funds for the owner’s consumption or 
retirement needs, to buy back partners’ shares, or pay estate taxes. Sixth, 
willingness to take risks, including using debt to obtain funds, varies among 
small business owners in a wide spectrum—from conservative, mostly self- 
financed firms to impatient entrepreneurs. Combining the difference in the 
tolerance for failure and degrees of optimisms among owners, a large cross
10 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 1(1)1991
sectional variation in capital structure could be observed even if all other 
variations are controlled.
Seventh, a small business goes through several stages of change in its 
evolution into a large firm. Consequently, there may not be a single theory 
explaining the capital structure of small businesses. Indeed, a more plausible 
view is that there could be many versions of the capital structure theory 
appropriate for small businesses at each stage of development. For instance, 
a version for the formative stage of the firm, where financing sources are 
from owners, friends and relatives, may indicate a rather low cost of funds. 
Solutions to agency problems are by means of implicit contracts, or social 
conventions. The asymmetric information problem is probably low. At the 
next stage, when outside funds such as bank loans, are obtained, new 
monitoring mechanisms are installed. Small businesses have the incentives 
to acquire a reputation through repeated dealings. Legal remedies may be 
called upon to enforce explicit contracts, including claims on owners’ 
personal assets. When small businesses acquire funds from private lenders 
such as venture capital firms, different financing instruments are employed 
to reduce agency and asymmetric information problems. For instance, equity 
participation and multistage financing [3] are used to reduce potential gains 
to agency incentive and to reduce exposure as more information about the 
firm’s prospects and management is acquired over time. If market 
imperfection, agency and information problems are serious enough, the cost 
of capital could be a lot higher than in the earlier phase. The graduation 
of a small firm to a publicly owned company via an initial public offering 
(IPO) changes the choice and availability of financing. It also entails a new 
set of monitors for the outside shareholders, and new means to solve 
asymmetric information via signalling. Eighth, organizational forms could 
affect the small businesses’ ability to carry debt. Since debt could magnify 
the already large agency problems in a partnership, such as leaving the 
remaining partners the debt burden, it would be expected that partnership 
would carry little or no debt. On the other hand, a franchise could carry a 
lot more debt. A franchise, via the franchise fee, purchases the franchiser’s 
know-how, experience, proven track record, management and organization 
that will lead to a reduction in business risks. The more valuable the 
franchise, and the greater the monitoring and quality control effort expended 
by the franchisor, the larger the amount of debt the franchisee could obtain.
From the discussions above, it would be far too simple to characterize 
small businesses as possessing higher or smaller cost of capital or amount 
of debt. A capital structure theory for small businesses would likely not be 
very complete. There would still be loose ends, such as why owners are willing 
to take on large debt with undiversified personal portfolios, or why some 
investors are willing to advance funds based on low quality information.
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Dividends
The rationale and use of dividends in small businesses are also quite 
different. Owners of small businesses integrate the firm’s distributions, salary 
and bonuses, with personal incomes into a personal consumption function. 
Dividends received is only a component. Founders/entrepreneurs are willing 
to postpone consumption by accepting no or low dividends, while heirs with 
no control rights and alternate sources of income may prefer high dividends. 
Second, dividends may be the major means to solving the agency problems 
in a partnership (including subchapter S corporations for both agency and 
tax reasons). In the traditional theory of dividends, where it is implicitly 
assumed that dividends will ultimately be paid, the question is a matter of 
when, whether paid early as dividends or late as capital gains. The dividend 
question in a small business with several owners is whether dividends would 
ever be paid at all. Third, the role of negative dividends in the form of 
additional owners’ contributions in time of growth as well as in crisis is also 
unique to small businesses. In a modified pecking order theory of small 
business financing, owners contributions is probably second to internally 
generated funds, ahead of outside debt in the order of financing preference. 
Large asymmetric information and perceived agency costs by the outsiders, 
and high transaction costs would make costs of outside funds greater than 
the owners’ returns from alternative investment opportunities.
Liquidity
Finance practitioners know that the single finance item that occupies 
the greatest amount of small businesses’ time is the management of working 
capital, including the management of slacks, or excess liquid funds. There 
are good reasons why owners pay so much attention to the liquidity of the 
business[2]. They would prefer to have stock at both the corporate and 
personal level to be free from closer monitoring by the lenders, to reduce 
the costs and risks of renegotiation, to minimize the probability of premature 
liquidation by the lenders in the case of temporary financial difficulties under 
asymmetric information. Small business corporations may use slack to 
accumulate excess profit as well.
The case for using financial slacks to invest in projects with private 
information is more relevant in small firms when the possibility of large 
discrepancies in information and expectations is higher. Of course, if the 
higher valuation of a project is due to overly optimistic expectations 
accumulated by the small businesses, slacks would instead encourage 
suboptimal overinvestment.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that starting from the unique features that characterize 
small businesses, a different set of finance problems could be developed. Out 
of this set, small businesses are shown to make financial decisions differently 
from the large firms. Some potentially testable conjectures are discussed. 
Mindful that small businesses are a heterogeneous group, a more detailed 
modeling of small firms would have to be more firm type/organization 
specific. Nevertheless, there are enough differences between large and small 
firms’ financial management practices and theory that justify the research 
effort to study the latter.
REFERENCES
[1] Ang, J., J. Chua and J. McConnell, “The Administrative Costs of Business Bankruptcy,” 
Journal of Finance, March 1982.
[2] Ang, J., ‘‘The Corporate Slack Controversy,” Advances in Working Capital, JAI Press: 
Greenwich, CT, forthcoming.
[3] Chan, Y., D. Siegal and A. Thakor, ‘‘Learning, Corporate Control and Performance 
Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts,” International Economic Review, 1990.
[4] Fama, E. and M. Jensen, “Aging Problems and Residual Claims,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, June 1983, pp. 327- 349.
[5] Fama, E. and M. Jensen, “Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions,” Journal 
of Financial Economics, March 1985, pp. 101-120.
[6] Irish, L., R. Ludwig and R. Rizzo (eds.), “The New Attractions of Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans,” Law and Business, Prentice Hall: Clifton, NJ, 1988.
[7] Kihlstrom, R. and J. Laffont, “A General Equilibrium Entrepreneural Theory of Firm 
Formation Based on Risk Aversion,” Journal of Political Economy, August, 1979, pp. 
719-748.
[8] Myers, S. and N. Majluj, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics, June 
1984, pp. 187-222.
Small Business Uniqueness and the Theory of Financial Management 13
